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Abstract: In this paper I explicate and assess a logical argument from evil put 
forth by the Swedish analytic philosopher Ingemar Hedenius in his book Tro 
och vetande (eng. Faith and Knowledge) (1949), by far the most famous and 
influential critique of Christianity in Swedish intellectual history. I seek to show 
that Hedenius’ argument is significantly different from, and indeed stronger 
than, the paradigmatic logical argument from evil in the analytic tradition, 
i.e. that of John mackie (1955). Nevertheless, Hedenius’ argument is, I argue, 
ultimately unconvincing.
This paper has three parts. In the first part I  offer an explication 
of a  logical argument from evil put forth by the Swedish analytic 
philosopher Ingemar Hedenius1 in his book Tro och vetande (eng. Faith 
and Knowledge) (1949), by far the most famous and influential critique 
of Christianity in Swedish intellectual history.2 In the second part 
I compare Hedenius’ argument with the paradigmatic logical argument 
from evil in the analytic tradition, namely that of John mackie (1955), 
1 Hedenius (1908-1982) was Professor of Practical Philosophy at uppsala university 
in 1947–1973, and one of the most influential Swedish intellectuals of his time. He was 
strongly influenced by David Hume, and wrote numerous philosophy books and papers 
in Swedish, and a  few also in english, e.g. Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley’s 
Philosophy (uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1936) and Studies in Hume’s Ethics (uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1937).
2 To this day Hedenius is viewed by Swedish intellectuals as the chief ‘prophet’ of 
Swedish secularism; see e.g. P.C. Jersild, ‘bör man skilja på tro och vetande?’, Dagens 
Nyheter (Nov. 9, 2002), Hans ruin, ‘Ingemar Hedenius: “Tro och vetande”’, Dagens Nyheter 
(Jan. 25, 2010), and Johan lundborg, ‘Den ständiga konflikten mellan tro och vetande’, 
Svenska Dagbladet (Aug. 1, 2010). There is even a well-known saying in Swedish popular 
culture that goes: ‘There is no God, and Hedenius is his prophet.’
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and seek to show that Hedenius’ argument is significantly different from, 
and indeed stronger than, mackie’s argument. In the third part I examine 
some objections to Hedenius’ argument put forth by Sebastian rehnman 
(2002), and argue that these objections are unsuccessful, largely because 
they assume that Hedenius’ argument has the same structure and 
content as mackie’s. Toward the end of the paper I seek to identify a main 
problem with Hedenius’ argument.
I. HeDeNIuS’ ArGumeNT
Hedenius’ argument from evil in (1949) aims at showing that the 
presence of evil in the world is logically inconsistent with the existence of 
‘the God of orthodox Christianity’, and, hence, that the God of orthodox 
Christianity ‘does not exist’.3 (by ‘orthodox Christianity’ Hedenius is not 
referring to eastern orthodoxy, but to traditional Christian theology 
as found, e.g., in traditional lutheran theology.) In seeking to achieve 
this aim, Hedenius draws heavily on considerations pertaining to the 
Christian doctrine of salvation (as he understands it), and his argument 
could accordingly be described as a ‘soteriological’ argument from evil.
1.1. The main passages
I will begin by offering a survey of the main passages in which Hedenius 
states his argument. He begins his presentation by saying:4
(A) [leibniz] believed that what is essential in Christianity could be 
defended against all purely logical objections. [...] He was of course 
aware of the intellectual difficulties that thinking people have always 
thought themselves to find in the Christian doctrine of redemption 
[...]. He also invested all his energy into solving these difficulties and 
declaring them void. but as to the failure of these attempts [...] there is 
little doubt. No critical person nowadays thinks that leibniz once so 
famous solution in his Theodicy provides a satisfactory answer [...]. Is 
there any other and better answer? Not that I know of. until a change 
comes about on this point I must be satisfied with formulating these 
3 ‘den ortodoxa kristendomens Gud [...] existerar [inte]’; Ingemar Hedenius, Tro och 
vetande (Stockholm: bonniers, 1949), p. 120. (All translation from Swedish into english 
in this paper are my own.)
4 I will refer to the passages to be cited from Tro och vetande by the letters ‘A’, ‘b’, ‘C’, 
etc., so as to facilitate subsequent references.
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purely logical objections as clearly as I can and let the reader make 
a decision as to their cogency [...]5
Having made it clear that he takes the problem of evil to be a  logical 
problem attaching specifically to the Christian doctrine of salvation, 
Hedenius goes on to develop his argument as follows. He first draws 
attention to Christianity’s understanding of God’s attributes of 
almightiness and perfect goodness:
(b) According to Christianity God is almighty [...] nothing occurs 
in the universe without having been willed or permitted by God. 
[...] Furthermore, God is perfectly good [...] [he] does [not] use his 
almightiness in a way that all fairly sensitive and enlightened people 
would unquestionably consider cruel and deeply unloving had 
a being in this world acted in the same way.6
Hedenius then proceeds to state the argument as follows:
(C) An obvious absurdity emerges when these two points of the 
Christian faith are joined to that part of the same faith that deals 
with the condition and state of human beings. The decisive feature 
of the condition and state of human beings is supposed to be [...] 
that humans have sinned against God and can only be saved from 
this horrible guilt of sin – the consequences of which must otherwise 
be horrific for the sinner because of God’s unappeasable wrath – by 
a plan of salvation that depends on intervention by God himself.7
5 ‘[leibniz] trodde, att det väsentliga i  kristendomen kan försvaras mot alla rent 
logiska invändningar. [...] Naturligtvis var även han underkunnig om de tankesvårigheter, 
som tänkande människor alltid tyckt sig finna i själva den kristna försoningsläran [...] 
Han lade också ner hela sin energi ... på att lösa dessa svårigheter och förklara dem 
obefintliga. men om det misslyckade i detta försök [...] torde det inte råda något tvivel. 
Ingen kritisk människa uppfattar numera leibniz’ en gång så berömda Théodicée som 
ett tillfredsställande svar [...] Finns det något annat svar som är bättre? Intet som jag 
känner till. Intill dess en förändring härutinnan uppkommit måste jag nöja mig med att 
formulera dessa rent logiska invändningar så klart jag kan och låta läsaren ta ställning till 
dem själv.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, pp. 90–91.
6 ‘enligt den kristna religionen är Gud allsmäktig ... ingenting sker i  universum 
utan att vara velat eller medgivet av Gud. [...] Vidare är Gud fullkomligt god [...] [han] 
använder [inte] sin allmakt på ett sätt som av alla någorlunda känsliga och upplysta 
människor utan tvekan skulle betraktas som grymt eller grovt kärlekslöst, om en varelse 
av denna världen betedde sig på ett liknande sätt.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, pp. 91–92.
7 ‘en uppenbar absurditet kommer emellertid i dagen, när de nu återgivna två delarna 
av den kristna tron sammanförs med den delen av samma tro, som närmare handlar om 
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The above conclusion, i.e. that there is an ‘obvious absurdity’ in the 
Christian doctrine of salvation in view of God’s almightiness and 
perfect goodness, recurs repeatedly in the passages following the above 
quotation (although in different words):
(D) Irrespectively of how one views it, this religion seems to be 
a mistake, simply because it appears to be an incoherent mess from 
a  logical point of view as soon as we remind ourselves what kind 
of being this God is supposed to be. He is supposed to be not only 
almighty but also perfectly loving towards people.8
(e) even if one, as is often the case nowadays, chooses not to believe 
in the idea of Adam and the Devil [...] who through eve engaged in 
deception and hereby caused the passing on of sin against God to all 
mankind [...] our wickedness remains from a  religious perspective 
a state that God in his almightiness allows us to be in. At the same 
time God could, if he had wanted to, have created all and only friends 
unto himself instead of sinners and criminals.9
(F) There is a  saying that stems from antiquity and which leibniz’ 
opponent Voltaire also used. It goes like this: if God is almighty, 
it follows that he is not perfectly good, and if he is perfectly good, it 
follows that he is not almighty. In precisely this way one can bring 
to mind that basic idea of Christianity which makes this religion 
contradict eternal truth.10
människornas villkor och öden. Det avgörande i  människans villkor och öden skulle 
ju [...] vara att alla människor har syndat emot Gud och att enda sättet att få befrielse 
från denna syndaskuld, vars konsekvenser på grund av Guds oblidkeliga hat mot synden 
annars måste bli fruktansvärda för den enskilde, är en frälsningsprocedur, som beror på 
en rad ingripanden av Gud själv.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, p. 94.
8 ‘Hur man än vrider och vänder på denna åskådning tycks den vara ett misstag, 
helt enkelt därför att den framstår som ett sammelsurium ur logisk synpunkt, så snart 
vi erinrar oss vad slags väsen denne Gud samtidigt skall vara. Han skall ju inte bara 
vara allsmäktig utan också fullkomligt kärleksfull mot människorna.’ Hedenius, Tro och 
vetande, pp. 94–95.
9 ‘Även om man, som numera ofta sker, avstår från föreställningen om Adams av 
djävulen [...] anstiftade förförelse genom eva och hela människosläktets på grund därav 
nedärvda synd mot Gud [...] så blir vår ondska ur religiös synpunkt ett öde som Gud i sin 
allmakt låter påvila oss. Samtidigt innebär denna allmakt att han mycket väl hade kunnat 
ge oss ett annat öde. om han hade velat det, och han kunde ha velat det, så skulle han 
i stället för ett släkte av syndare och brottslingar, som blivit hans egna fiender, ha skapat 
idel vänner till sig.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, p. 95.
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(G) That the God of orthodox Christianity does not exist can be proven 
from the circumstance that this God has contradictory attributes;10he 
is both loving and unloving, almighty and not almighty.11
As can be seen, the above passages countenance the conclusion that 
orthodox Christianity is ‘a  mistake’, ‘an incoherent mess’ (passage D), 
‘inconsistent with eternal truth’ (passage F), and ‘logically contradictory’ 
(passage G) – simply put, that orthodox Christianity is false.
1.2. The structure of the argument
The main structure of Hedenius’ above argument seems to be as follows. 
Christianity claims that God is almighty and perfectly good. An almighty 
God could have prevented the fall of mankind into sin and its consequent 
need of salvation (passage e). And, assuming that we understand the 
term ‘good’ in a  fairly sensitive and enlightened way, a perfectly good 
God would have prevented mankind’s fall into sin (passages b and D). but 
according to Christianity, God has not prevented this, so either God is 
not almighty or he is not perfectly good (primarily passage C). However, 
Christianity holds that God is both almighty and perfectly good; hence, 
Christianity is contradictory (primarily passage G). In brief outline:
(1) Christianity claims that (i) God is almighty and perfectly good, 
and that (i) mankind has fallen into sin and can be saved only 
through God’s plan of salvation.
(2) God’s plan of salvation entails that God is not both almighty and 
perfectly good, for an almighty being could have prevented the 
Fall, and a good being – provided the term ‘good’ is understood 
in a fairly sensitive and enlightened way – would have prevented 
the Fall.
(3) Hence Christianity entails that God is almighty and perfectly 
good and that God is not both almighty and perfectly good. 
(From 1 and 2.)
(4) Hence Christianity is contradictory, and hence false. (From 3.)
10 ‘Det finns ett från antiken härstammande talesätt, som redan Voltaire, leibniz’ 
opponent, använde. Det lyder: om Gud är allsmäktig, så följer att han inte är allgod, 
och om Gud är allgod, så följer att han inte är allsmäktig. Just så kan man påminna om 
den grundtanke i kristendomen, som gör att denna religion strider mot vad som är evig 
sanning.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, p. 101. (by ‘eternal truth’ Hedenius is referring to 
the laws of logic.)
11 ‘Att den ortodoxa kristendomens Gud inte existerar, det kan visserligen bevisas, 
emedan denne Gud har logiskt oförenliga egenskaper; han är ju både kärleksfull och 
icke-kärleksfull, allsmäktig och icke allsmäktig.’ Hedenius, Tro och vetande, p. 120.
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The core claim of Hedenius’ argument seems to be that the almighty 
and perfectly good God of orthodox Christianity could and would have 
prevented the Fall, and that, therefore, the God of orthodox Christianity 
does not exist, since the Fall has not been prevented. A core assumption, 
moreover, is that the term ‘good’ (or ‘goodness’) is understood in a fairly 
sensitive and enlightened way when orthodox Christianity predicates 
perfect goodness of God.
II. THe relATIVe STreNGTH oF HeDeNIuS’ ArGumeNT
I  proceed now to compare Hedenius’ argument with mackie’s logical 
argument from evil, intending hereby to show that Hedenius’ argument 
is the stronger one. mackie’s argument is no doubt the most famous 
logical argument from evil in modern analytic philosophy. It is drawn 
upon by recent defenders of the logical argument from evil such as 
michael martin,12 and is also the chief argument to which Alvin Plantinga 
responds in developing his famous Free Will Defence13 (a defence which 
many contemporary philosophers of religion consider decisive).14
2.1. Mackie’s argument
mackie’s argument from evil finds succinct summary in his claim that 
the three propositions
(5) ‘God is omnipotent’,
(6) ‘God is wholly good’,
(7) ‘evil exists’
constitute a ‘contradiction’. He says:
There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, 
so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. but at the 
same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions; the 
theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere 
to all three.15
12 michael martin, Atheism: A  Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple 
university Press, 1990), pp. 362-391.
13 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand rapids: eerdmans, 1977), pp. 12-24.
14 See e.g. William Alston, ‘The Inductive Argument from evil and the Human 
Cognitive Condition’, in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder 
(bloomington: Indiana university Press, 1996), pp. 97-125 (p. 97); William rowe, ‘In 
Defense of “The Free Will Defense”’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 44 
(1998), 115-120 (p. 115); and William Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the 
Issues (boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 47.
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This, then, is the basic idea of mackie’s argument from evil. (In order15to 
derive a contradiction from (5)–(7) mackie makes use of the principles 
‘a  good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can’ and ‘there are no 
limits to what an omnipotent being can do’.16 These additional principles 
have no impact on the comparison of mackie’s and Hedenius’ arguments 
that I shall make, however, and shall therefore be left aside.)
2.2. Comparison with Hedenius’ argument
There are both similarities and differences between Hedenius’ and 
mackie’s respective arguments. A  similarity is that both arguments 
seek to point out a  logical contradiction between certain propositions 
pertaining to God and a proposition pertaining to evil. both arguments 
are thus so-called logical arguments from evil (as opposed to, say, 
evidential arguments from evil).
A  difference, however, concerns the conclusions of the respective 
arguments. Whereas mackie’s argument issues in the conclusion that 
‘God’ does not exist, Hedenius’ argument issues in the more specific 
conclusion that ‘the God of orthodox Christianity’ does not exist. 
Hedenius’ argument is accordingly explicitly anti-Christian in a way that 
mackie’s is not.
A  further and related difference is that Hedenius’ argument draws 
heavily on themes pertaining to Christian soteriology, whereas mackie’s 
argument says nothing at all, and presupposes nothing at all, with regard 
to Christian soteriology. All that mackie presupposes that overlaps with 
Christian theology is that God is ‘almighty’ and ‘perfectly good’.
In the next section I shall argue that Hedenius’ argument is stronger 
than mackie’s.
2.3. The relative strength of Hedenius’ argument
As was noted above, a  core claim of Hedenius’ argument is that the 
almighty and perfectly good God of orthodox Christianity could and 
would have prevented the Fall, and that, since the Fall has not been 
prevented, the God of orthodox Christianity does not exist. This claim 
makes Hedenius’ argument very different from mackie’s, which does 
not presuppose any theology of the Fall, but relies instead on the simple 
proposition that ‘evil exists’. This difference, I believe, renders Hedenius’ 
15 John mackie, ‘evil and omnipotence’, Mind, vol. 64, no. 254 (1955), 200.
16 John mackie, ‘evil and omnipotence’, p. 200.
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argument stronger than mackie’s, for in this way Hedenius manages to 
avoid two controversial presuppositions of mackie’s argument.
The two controversial presuppositions of mackie’s argument that 
I have in mind are:
(i) that it presupposes a controversial ontology of evil; and
(ii) that it presupposes that God’s almightiness entails an ability 
to rule over the actions of free agents, which many consider 
logically impossible.
In what follows I show that Hedenius’ argument presupposes neither 
of these two things.
Consider first the presupposition of an ontology of evil. According 
to such an ontology there are such things as evils, that is, among the 
things that exist and make up the ‘furniture of the universe’ there are 
such things as ‘evils’ (be they abstract or concrete and particular makes 
no difference). This presupposition is rejected by a significant strand of 
Christian theologians from Augustine onward, according to which evil 
is a privation or absence of good (privatio bono) rather than a positive 
existence.17 Since Hedenius’ argument does not use the premise that 
‘evil exists’, it does not presuppose an ontology of evil, and so cannot be 
objected to on the ground that evil is not a positive existence. This, then, 
is a first strength of Hedenius’ argument over against mackie’s.
Consider next the presupposition that God’s almightiness involves 
an ability to rule over the actions of free agents. mackie’s argument 
presupposes that God’s almightiness entails an ability to prevent ‘evil’ 
(any evil), and hence an ability to prevent the evil that may result from 
the actions of free agents. This entailment has long been considered 
a chief weakness of mackie’s argument by critics of the argument such 
as Plantinga, who argue that God ‘can’t cause or determine’ creatures 
who ‘are significantly free’, for ‘if He does so, then they aren’t significantly 
free after all’.18 Hedenius’ argument does not presuppose that God’s 
almightiness entails that God is able to rule over the actions of free 
agents, it only presupposes that God was able to prevent the occurrence 
of one particular historical event, namely the Fall, and God’s ability to 
prevent the Fall need not be tied to any ability to rule over the actions of 
free agents. (After all, the Fall might have been prevented in numerous 
17 on the privatio bono view, see John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (london: The 
macmillian Press, 1988), pp. 38–58.
18 Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, p. 30.
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ways other than ruling over the actions of free agents.) So for this reason 
too, Hedenius’ argument seems to be the stronger one.
III. CrITICISmS oF HeDeNIuS’ ArGumeNT
I turn now to criticism of Hedenius’ argument. I begin by considering 
some objections to Hedenius’ argument put forth by rehnman in (2002), 
and argue that these objections are unconvincing. After that I propose 
a  new objection, which I  think identifies a  problem with Hedenius’ 
argument.
3.1. Rehnman’s explication
rehnman’s main contention in (2002) is that Hedenius never succeeds in 
formulating or proving the presence of an inconsistency in Christianity.19 
However, contrary to the explication given in Section 1.2, rehnman does 
not treat Hedenius’ argument as containing any premises pertaining 
specifically to Christian soteriology (although he does say, in passing, 
that themes pertaining to Christian theology are a  part of Hedenius’ 
understanding of the problem of evil).20 Instead, rehnman understands 
Hedenius’ argument as consisting in an attempt to derive a contradiction 
from the following three propositions:21
(8) God exists and is almighty.
(9) God exists and is perfectly good.
(10) There is evil in the world.
rehnman says:
Taken together [8]-[10] are held to give rise to the logical problem of 
evil; two of the propositions in this set can be thought to be compatible, 
but not together with the third one. Hedenius accordingly holds 
that it is necessary for the Christian to deny the conjunction of these 
propositions.22
19 Sebastian rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara: Kunskapsteori och metafysik hos 
Ingmar Hedenius (Nora: Nya Doxa, 2002), p. 297.
20 rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 193.
21 ‘(1) Gud existerar och är allsmäktig (2) Gud existerar och är allgod och (3) Det 
förekommer ondska i världen.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 194.
22 ‘Sammantagna anses (1)–(3) ge upphov till det ondas logiska problem; två av 
i denna mängd ingående påståenden kan tänkas vara förenliga, men inte tillsammans 
med det tredje. Hedenius menar följaktligen att det är nödvändigt att för den kristne att 
förneka konjunktionen av dessa påståenden.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 194.
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(10) here takes over the role played by (2) in Section 1.2, i.e. the role of 
pushing the Christian concept of God to a contradiction. Interestingly, 
(10) is extracted from the same passage from which (2) is extracted, 
i.e. passage e. rehnman seems to think that the soteriological themes 
in passage e do not figure in Hedenius’ argument as such, but merely 
provide the context for extracting the claim that there is evil in the world.
This is a  mistake, however, for Hedenius makes it clear that his 
argument from evil pertains specifically to Christian soteriology – as 
is seen e.g. in passages A, C and e. The soteriological themes in these 
passages are crucial to Hedenius’ argument, whereas, on the other hand, 
the proposition that ‘there is evil’ does not figure in Hedenius’ argument 
at all. This fact is also noted by Johan lundborg in his book on Hedenius:
Hedenius’ theodicy [by which is meant Hedenius’ argument from evil] does 
not take its vantage point in the presence of evil in the world, but in the 
circumstance that God’s attributes are incompatible with salvation history.23
rehnman’s misunderstanding of the basic structure of Hedenius’ 
argument from evil results in corresponding mistakes in his objections 
to the argument, as we shall see below.
3.2. Rehnman’s first objection
A first objection of rehnman’s is as follows:
In contrast to mackie (1955: 26), Hedenius’ position in Faith and 
Knowledge is that there is an ‘obvious absurdity’ among the elements of 
the set olP [i.e. the set of premises (8)–(10)]. but the incompatibility 
or incompossibilitas is not, as e.g. Pike (1963: 40) and Plantinga (1967: 
115–30; 1974a: 12–24; 1985: 38) have pointed out, obvious in first-order 
logic, nor is it explicit or formal.24
rehnman seems here to assume that Hedenius, in using the expression 
‘obvious absurdity’ in the above passage C (see Section 1.1), intends to 
say either
23 ‘Hedenius teodicé har således inte sin utgångspunkt i  att det finns ont i  världen 
utan i att Guds egenskaper inte går ihop med frälsningshistorien.’ Johan lundborg, När 
ateismen erövrade Sverige: Ingemar Hedenius och debatten kring tro och vetande (Nora: 
Nya Doxa, 2002), p. 72.
24 ‘Till skillnad från t.ex. mackie (1955: 26) menar Hedenius i Tro och vetande att det 
föreligger en “uppenbar absurditet” mellan elementen i mängden olP. men incompossi-
bilitas eller oförenligheten är inte, såsom bl.a. Pike (1963: 40) och Plantinga (1967: 
115-30; 1974a: 12-24; 1985: 38) påpekar, uppenbar i  första ordningens logik, ej heller 
vare sig explicit eller formell.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 194.
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(i) that there is an obvious contradiction between (11)–(13) in 
first-order logic; or that
(ii) there is an explicit or formal contradiction between the 
propositions (8)-(10), i.e. a conjunction of the form ‘p and not-p’.
(Apart from this assumption, there would be no point in introducing 
Pike’s and Plantinga’s contrasting observation with the word ‘but’.)
but why think that Hedenius by ‘obvious absurdity’ had in mind 
a contradiction in first-order logic, or an explicit or formal contradiction? 
This assumption seems groundless. The term ‘obvious’ is ordinarily used 
in many ways other than to call attention to something that is clear in 
first-order logic or that is stated explicitly or formally. Why not think, 
say, that Hedenius in using this expression simply meant to say that 
the presence of a contradiction among the relevant propositions is not 
difficult to see? That it is not difficult to see a contradiction does not mean 
or entail that the contradiction is either explicit or formal, or that it is 
clear in first-order logic. For example, it is not difficult to see that the 
proposition that my only car is red contradicts the proposition that my 
only car lacks a colour; but there is nevertheless no explicit or formal 
contradiction here, nor do we get a contradiction if we assume a first-
order logic setting.
A  deeper problem with the above objection, however, is that it 
simply gets Hedenius’ argument wrong. Nowhere in the passages A-G 
in Section 1.1 does Hedenius ever explicate his argument from evil in 
terms of propositions of the sort (8)–(10), nor does he ever state that his 
argument from evil consists in pointing out a contradiction between such 
propositions. rehnman’s objection is therefore not merely unconvincing, 
it is irrelevant.
How are we to account for rehnman’s misunderstanding of the basic 
form of Hedenius’ argument from evil? I believe the answer is indicated in 
the above quotation. rehnman there assumes that Hedenius’ argument 
from evil is essentially the same argument as mackie’s. And, indeed, 
the argument that rehnman gives in terms of (8)–(10) is essentially 
the same argument as mackie’s (as should be clear from the survey of 
mackie’s argument in Section 2). but the argument of mackie is, as we 
have seen, not that of Hedenius. by failing to note this, rehnman ends 
up objecting to a straw man.
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3.3. Rehnman’s further objections
Apart from the above objection, rehnman levels various further 
objections to Hedenius’ argument on the assumption that the argument 
from evil in (1949) is identical to one of Hedenius’ later arguments from 
evil put forth in Om människans moraliska villkor (eng. On the Moral 
Conditions of Man) (1972). In what follows I show that this assumption 
is mistaken, and that it once again renders rehnman’s objections to 
Hedenius’ argument from evil in (1949) irrelevant.
In (1972) Hedenius presents the following argument from evil:
(11) If God exists, then our universe is the best possible U.
(12) With regard to any state of affairs S which is such that there is 
some evil in S, it is the case that S is not the best possible state of 
affairs, for another state of affairs S’ such that S’ contains just as 
much good (0 or > 0) as S and less evil than S, is always possible, 
and S’ would be better than S.
(13) U is a state of affairs;
(14) There is a large amount of evil in U.
(15) Hence U is not the best possible U.
(16) Hence God does not exist.25
rehnman takes this argument to be basically identical to the argument 
from evil in (1949). This is clearly a mistake, however, for the premises of 
the two arguments are very different from each other. In particular, the 
argument in (1949) involves no claims about a best possible world.
unsurprisingly, rehnman’s objections to the argument in (1972) are 
simply irrelevant to the argument in (1949). The objections are:
(i) that the concept of the best possible world is logically 
contradictory;
(ii) that it is not ‘essential to Christianity’26 to hold that God has 
created the best possible world;
25 ‘(1) om Gud existerar, så är vårt universum det bästa möjliga U. (2) beträffande 
varje sakförhållande, S, som är sådant att det finns något ont i  S, gäller att S inte är 
det bästa möjliga sakförhållandet, ty ett annat sakförhållande, S’, som är sådant, att S’ 
innehåller lika mycket gott (0 eller > 0) som S och mindre ont än S eller inget ont alls, 
är alltid möjligt, och S’ skulle vara bättre än S. (3)U är ett sakförhållande. (4) Det finns 
en stor mängd ont i U. (5) U är inte det bästa möjliga U. Följer av (2), (3), (4). (6) Gud 
existerar inte. Följer av (1), (5).’ Hedenius, Om människans moraliska villkor, p. 267. 
(I have changed the numbering of Hedenius’ premises in my translation so as to fit the 
numbering of the present paper; the same has been done with regard to the numberings 
of all passages from Hedenius and rehnman quoted in this paper.)
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(iii) that it is not obvious that God is obliged to create26the best logically 
possible universe or that God is not good if God does not create 
it;27 and
(iv) that the idea that the best possible universe must lack evil is highly 
doubtful.28
Neither of these objections are relevant to the argument in (1949) for 
the simple reason that that argument does not involve any premise about 
a best possible world.
I conclude, then, that rehnman misunderstands Hedenius’ argument 
from evil in (1949), and that his objections are impacted by this in a way 
that renders them largely irrelevant.
3.4. A new objection
I proceed now to develop a new objection to Hedenius’ argument. The 
objection is directed at the argument’s assumption that we understand 
the term ‘good’ in what Hedenius calls a ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ 
sense. This assumption was inserted into premise (2) of the argument 
given in section 1.2, i.e.:
(2) God’s plan of salvation entails that God is not both almighty and 
perfectly good, for an almighty being could have prevented the 
Fall, and a good being – provided the term ‘good’ is understood in a 
fairly sensitive and enlightened way – would have prevented the Fall.
It seems that there is an important ambiguity here. The ambiguity concerns 
whether this assumption (italicized above) is the assumption that
(i) we are to make in stating that orthodox Christianity claims that 
God is perfectly good, but which orthodox Christianity need not 
be assumed to make, or that
(ii) orthodox Christianity makes when it claims that God is perfectly 
good.
I believe it can be plausibly shown that if Hedenius understands the 
assumption in sense (i), his argument turns out logically invalid, whereas if 
he understands it in sense (ii), a crucial assumption of the argument turns 
out deeply problematic. In either case, then, the argument is in trouble.
26 ‘väsentlig för kristendomen.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 200.
27 ‘men det är inte uppenbart att Gud är förpliktigad att skapa det logiskt bästa möjliga 
universumet eller att Gud inte är allgod om Gud inte skapar det.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap 
och vara, p. 200.
28 ‘Tanken att det bästa möjliga universumet måste sakna ondska är därför en ytterst 
tveksam premiss.’ rehnman, Gud, kunskap och vara, p. 202.
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I  seek first to show that if the assumption is to be understood in 
sense (i), the argument turns out logically invalid. This is so inasmuch 
as the argument is concerned with showing that ‘orthodox Christianity’ 
is self-contradictory, i.e. that orthodox Christianity entails, as in the 
inference (3) of the argument of Section 1.2, that God is almighty and 
perfectly good and not almighty and perfectly good. In order to make 
this inference – i.e. the inference of (3) from (1) and (2) – the sense in 
which God is ‘good’ (or ‘perfectly good’) in (1) and (2) must be the same, 
for otherwise we have a fallacy of equivocation. Since (1) simply reports 
what orthodox Christianity claims, the sense of ‘good’ in (1) is the sense 
of ‘good’ assumed by orthodox Christianity. Accordingly, if the sense of 
‘good’ assumed in (2) – i.e. the ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ sense – is 
not that of Christianity but of Hedenius’ readers, then the argument is 
equivocal, and hence logically invalid. Hence to be logically valid, the 
argument must rest on the assumption as understood in the sense (ii), 
that is, on the assumption that orthodox Christianity, in predicating 
perfect goodness of God, is using the term ‘good’ in what Hedenius calls 
a ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ sense.
I seek next to show that if we are to understand the assumption in the 
sense (ii), Hedenius’ argument turns out problematic. This is clear from 
the following two considerations.
First, Hedenius provides us with no evidence that ‘orthodox 
Christianity’ understands the term ‘good’ in the relevant ‘sensitive’ 
and ‘enlightened’ sense when predicated of God. Hedenius refers to no 
biblical texts, creeds, canons or influential theologians in support of this 
assumption. Instead, he simply takes the assumption for granted.
And secondly, there appears to be counter-evidence to Hedenius’ 
assumption. That is, there is evidence for the counter-claim that orthodox 
Christianity understands terms like ‘good’ as having a special meaning 
when predicated of God, and, in particular, as not meaning what we would 
ordinarily mean when using the terms. As Thomas Aquinas argued, and 
as many traditional Catholics and Protestants have repeated after him, 
terms applied to God have analogous meanings; ‘no name’, says Aquinas, 
‘is predicated univocally of God and creatures’.29 The notion of ‘analogous 
29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Salzburg: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1933), p. 64. 
(ST I, q13, a5.) For Protestant endorsements of the doctrine of analogy, see robert Preus, 
The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism, vol. 2 (St. louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1970), pp. 39–45.
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meaning’ is notoriously difficult to make precise, but it is at least clear 
that it is meant to entail that a term with an analogous meaning means 
something different from what it ordinarily or non-analogously means. 
‘univocal predication’, says Aquinas, ‘is impossible between God and 
creatures.’30 Now, since Hedenius’ argument presupposes that orthodox 
Christianity understands the term ‘good’ in the relevant ‘fairly sensitive’ 
and ‘enlightened’ sense when predicated of God, and since, as we have 
just seen, this appears to run counter to the doctrine of analogy endorsed 
by many traditional Christian theologians, it follows that we have reason 
to think that Hedenius’ argument rests on a mistaken presupposition, at 
least insofar as the relevant traditional Christian theologians are taken as 
representative of orthodox Christianity.
It could, of course, be questioned whether the relevant traditional 
Christian theologians should be taken as representative of orthodox 
Christianity. but then again, Hedenius has given us no reason to 
question this. So given this, and given that Hedenius provides us with 
no evidence for the assumption that orthodox Christianity understands 
the term ‘good’ in the relevant ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ sense 
when predicated of God, it would seem that Hedenius’ argument turns 
out problematic and unconvincing.
SummArY
In this paper I have offered an explication of Hedenius’ argument from 
evil in (1949), and have argued that this argument is stronger than the 
paradigmatic logical argument from evil in the analytic tradition, namely 
mackie’s argument in (1955). It is ‘stronger’ inasmuch as it presupposes 
fewer controversial assumptions than mackie’s argument.
A core claim of Hedenius’ argument was seen to be that the almighty 
and perfectly good God of orthodox Christianity would have prevented 
the Fall, and that, therefore, the God of orthodox Christianity does not 
exist, since the Fall has not been prevented. A  core assumption was 
moreover that the term ‘good’ is understood in what Hedenius calls 
a ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ sense when predicated of God.
I  have argued that although the objections levelled at Hedenius’ 
argument by rehnman in (2002) are mistaken, Hedenius’ argument is 
30 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, p. 64. (ST I, q13, a5.)
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still problematic. It is problematic in that the contradiction which it seeks 
to locate in orthodox Christianity can only be derived from orthodox 
Christianity on the assumption that orthodox Christianity uses the 
term ‘good’ in what Hedenius calls a  ‘fairly sensitive’ and ‘enlightened’ 
sense when it predicates perfect goodness of God, and this assumption 
was seen to be problematic partly because it is left unargued and partly 
because it fits ill with the traditional theological doctrine of analogy. If 
this is right it would seem that Hedenius’ argument, in spite of its strong 
points, is ultimately unconvincing.
